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DETERMINING THE RESIDENCE PART
OF A FARM OR RANCH
— by Neil E. Harl*
 On sale of a farm or ranch, it can be important how
much of the transaction is attributable to the residence and
how much to the rest of the farm.1 The question can be
significant for purposes of sale and possible tax free
reinvestment of the residence portion of the transaction,2
sale of the residence after age 55,3 and disallowance of any
loss on the residence part of the transaction.4
If the residence is sold as a part of the entire farm or
ranch, it may also be necessary to apportion the remaining
basis between the residence and the soil, neither of which is
depreciable, if that allocation has not already been
accomplished. The apportionment of basis may have been
severely restricted by virtue of earlier allocations of basis
among depreciable items of property.
Sale and reinvestment of residence
The term "residence," for purposes of the sale and tax-
free reinvestment provision,5 is defined broadly by
regulations and provides relatively little guidance as to how
much of a farm or ranch would be eligible for postponement
of gain.6 The residence may not, however, include any part
of the premises used for business purposes.7 Thus, the term
"residence" apparently would not include a garage housing
a business vehicle on a regular basis and would not include
the portion of the residence "exclusively used on a regular
basis" as an office in the home.8 With scalpel-like precision,
the office portion of the residence must be carved out and
not treated as part of the sale of the principal residence.
However, the business portion of the residence is eligible
for sale and reinvestment if no income tax deduction was
allowed for the business use in the year of sale.9
In a 1964 Tax Court case,10 a residence of five acres (out
of 236.6 acres) qualified for sale and reinvestment
treatment. Under a 1979 Tax Court decision, a residence of
1.5 acres out of seven acres was eligible for the rollover
provision.11 An earlier U.S. District Court case12 approved a
country estate of 65 acres for sale and reinvestment
treatment.
Sale after age 55
For purposes of the exclusion (for up to $125,000 of
gain) on the principal residence for taxpayers age 55 or
_____________________________________________________
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older,13 the term "residence" has the same meaning as for
the sale and reinvestment14 of the proceeds from the sale of
the residence.15 Indeed, the same problems arise with the
over 55 sale (ascertaining the portion of the transaction
which is "residence," determining the basis properly
allocable to the residence and calculating the portion of the
sales price attributable to the residence) as for the sale and
reinvestment provision.
Losses on the residence
As noted,16 losses on the personal residence are personal
losses and, therefore, are not income tax deductible.17 Thus,
if a farm is sold for a single price under circumstances such
that a loss may have been sustained on the residence
portion, the Internal Revenue Service may require that the
transaction be treated as separate sales of the residence and
the rest of the farm with the loss on the residence portion
nondeductible.18 A contract provision as to the value and
extent of the residence may be persuasive evidence of value
of the residence. A loss on the residence can very well
occur, considering improvements that may have been made
to the residence over the years, the fact that a residence
occupied by the owner is not depreciable and the fact that
many rural communities have a surplus of housing because
of farm consolidation.
Loss on sale of the residence by the surviving spouse
may be deductible if it can be demonstrated that the loss
was incurred in a "transaction entered into for profit."19
Moreover, a loss on the residence may be deductible if the
residence had been rented prior to sale20 although rental
incident to sale of the property is immaterial.21 For purposes
of determining loss, the basis for property converted from
personal to business use is the lesser of the adjusted basis at
the time of the conversion or fair market value of the
property at the time of the conversion adjusted for
improvements and depreciation for the period between
conversion and sale.22
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 5 Harl, Agricultural Law § 48.02[1]
(1993); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 6.03[2] (1993).
2 See I.R.C. § 1034.
3 I.R.C. § 121.
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9(a). See Cottrell v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1970-218.
5 I.R.C. § 1034.
6 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(c)(3)(ii).
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7 Id.
8 I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1).
9 Rev. Rul. 82-26, 1982-1 C.B. 114.
10 Est. of Campbell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1964-83.
11 Lokan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1979-380.
12 Bennett v. U.S., 61-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9697 (N.D. Ga. 1961).
13 I.R.C. § 121.
14 I.R.C. § 1034.
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(a).
16 See n. 4 supra.
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9(a).
18 See O'Byrne and Davenport, Farm Income Tax Manual
§ 329(c) (9th ed. 1987).
19 See Est. of Miller v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1967-44
(vacation residence).
20 See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9(b)(1).
21 Dawson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1972-4; Henry v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1983-277.
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9(b)(2).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE.  The debtor was the president and a
director of a grain dealer corporation that was also in
bankruptcy. The trustee in the corporation’s case sought an
order denying the discharge of the debtor under Section
727(a)(3) for falsification of records to the state department
of agriculture and the corporation’s auditors. The debtor
argued that Section 727(a)(3) applied only where the
falsification prevented the trustee from obtaining accurate
financial records and did not apply to falsification as to third
parties. The court held that because the debtor’s actions did
not prevent the trustee from obtaining accurate records in
the bankruptcy case, the discharge would not be denied. The
court noted that the corporation’s own poor records
prevented the trustee from obtaining accurate information.
The trustee also sought to deny the debtor’s discharge under
Section 523(a)(2) for tendering false financial records to the
state department of agriculture, resulting in continuation of
the corporation’s grain dealer license, credit purchases from
some producers, and the corporation's failure to pay for
these purchases. The court held that the trustee could not
bring a dischargeability action on behalf of only some of the
corporation’s creditors. The trustee in the corporation’s case
also sought denial of discharge of the debtor for fraud while
in a position of fiduciary duty. The court held that a director
of a corporation does not serve as a fiduciary as to the
corporation’s creditors. In re Martin, 162 B.R. 710
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1993).
ESTATE PROPERTY. Two years before filing for
bankruptcy, the debtors had established a revocable trust
with the debtors as trustees and beneficiaries. The debtors
had the right to revoke the trust at any time. The court held
that the right to revoke the trust was a property interest
which passed to the bankruptcy estate and the trustee had
the power to revoke the trust. In re Ross, 162 B.R. 863
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1993).
EXEMPTIONS.
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  After subtraction of the
consensual liens against the debtor’s homestead, the debtor
had equity in excess of the exemption amount. The debtor
argued that the fair market value of the house should be
reduced by the hypothetical costs of sale, but the court
rejected that valuation because the house was not going to
be sold. The debtor sought to avoid a judgment lien against
the house which partially impaired the exemption, arguing
that the entire lien should be avoided so that the debtor
would receive any future appreciation. The court held that
the judgment lien would be avoided only to the extent the
lien impaired the exemption. In re Abrahimzadeh, 162
B.R. 676 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1994).
HOUSEHOLD GOODS. The debtor claimed an
exemption, under Va. Code § 34-29, for two televisions, a
record player and a VCR. The court held that the items were
household goods eligible for the exemption. In re Hanes,
162 B.R. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994).
OBJECTIONS. The debtor originally filed a Chapter 13
case and claimed $3,000 in property as exempt. No
objections to the exemptions were filed. The case was
converted to Chapter 7 and another creditors’ examination
took place and the trustee filed an objection to the
exemptions within 30 days after the examination. The
debtor argued that the objection was invalid as untimely
because it was not filed within 30 days after the Chapter 13
creditors’ examination. Although the court recognized that
the rules did not explicitly provide for a new time limit for
objections after a conversion, the court held that the
conversion restarted the time limit for objections to
exemptions and that the trustee’s objection was timely. In re
Jenkins, 162 B.R. 589 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
RETIREMENT PLANS. The debtor owned an interest
in two retirement plans established by two companies for
their retired directors. The plans were paid from the
companies’ general revenues on an annual basis and did not
create any fund or trust corpus. The plans were not ERISA
qualified. The plans had spendthrift clauses restricting the
debtor’s transfer rights as to future payments. The court held
that the plans did not create trusts excludible from the
bankruptcy estate. In re Hanes, 162 B.R. 733 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE. The FmHA
sought conversion of the debtor’s Chapter 12 case to
Chapter 7 for fraud in attempting to hide assets belonging to
the bankruptcy estate. During the Rule 2004 examination of
the debtor, the FmHA discovered that the debtor had not
disclosed in the bankruptcy schedules bank account funds
